

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT**

DOCKET NO.: 03-15528-JJ

TERRENCE MATTHEWS,

Appellant,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee.

**On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
Jacksonville Division**

INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

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Terrence Matthews
Appellant

Honorable Thomas E. Morris
United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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TERRENCE MATTHEWS,

Appellant,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS (Continued)

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger
United States District Judge

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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

BecauseBecause of the nature of the factual and legal issues presented, undersigned
counselcounsel believes that oral argument wouldcounsel believes that oral argument would
disposition of this appeal.

ATTORNEY

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is this is an appeal of a final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Florida, which had jurisdiction in this criminal action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1623. Final judgment was entered on October 28, 2018. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. [R. 156, 157].

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULE 404(b) TESTIMONY REGARDING STREET-LIGHT TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED TRANSACTIONS FROM A 1991 ARREST OF THE APPELLANT.

II.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING WIRETAP EVIDENCE BECAUSE WIRETAP RECORDINGS WERE MADE BY THE COURT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WIRE INTERCEPTS.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES (Continued)

III.

**WHETHER WHETHER THE EVWHETHER THE EVIDEWETHER THE
SUSTSUSTAINSUSTAIN CONVICTIONS ON TWO COUNTS OF
WITNESWITNESSWITNESS INTIMIDATION AND A SENTENCE
ENHANCEMENTENHANCEMENT FOR OBSTRUENHANCEMEN
JUSTICE.**

IV.

**WHETHERWHETHER THE DISTRICTWHETHER THE DISTRICT WI
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EVIDENCEEVIDENCE OF A TELEPHONE CONVEVIDENCE OF A TEL
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ININ WHICH TIN WHICH THEIR WHICH THE APPELLAN
IMPLICATED.**

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

A. Course of Proceedings and Dispositions Below.

Terrence Terrence Matthews Terrence Matthews was indicted on April 24, 2003 on one count to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846. [R. 1]. He was released on an unsecured bond and entered 1]. He was released on an unsecured bond 11,11, 14]. Subsequently, he was charged by a superseding indictment with the same cocaine offense and with two counts of intimidating witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1512(b), [R. 87], and he again entered a plea of not guilty. [R. 90]. The court denied the Government's motion to deny the Government's motion to deny the Government's indictment. [R. 94].

Matthews Matthews moved to exclude wiretap audio recording evidence by the delay by the Government in sealing such recordings. [R. 63]. The court denied Matthews' motion to suppress the intercepted wiretap recordings. [R. 76]. He also moved to suppress evidence from two seizures and 76]. He also moved to suppress evidence of which had been noticed by the Government as Federal Reserve notes. [R. 84, 92, 110]. The magistrate judge recommended that the fruits of a 1997 seizure be granted, [R. 123],¹ but the district court subsequently

¹ The docket sheet reflects The docket sheet reflects that The docket sheet reflects the Recommendation concerning the acceptance of

denied the motion. [R. 135, 143; R. 169 - 11-21].² The motion to suppress the fruits of a 1991 motion to suppress the fruits of a -- 11-21]. Matthews then moved in limine t- 11-21 improper under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). [R. 133]. The district ruling on that motion, [R. 169 - 2], later denied the ruling on that motion, [R. 169 - 2], and finally overruled Matthews' objection to the 1991 171 - 70-71].

Matthews also filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of a conversation between two testifying alleged co-conspirators party, in which the other two individuals discussed party, in which than was charged, ecstasy. [R. 130]. The district court granted and denied it in part. [R. 135; R. 168 and denied it in part. [R. 135; R. 168

Recommendation actually relates to the Recommendation actually relates to seizure.

² Subsequently, Matthews filed motions in limine to exclude evidence to the 1997 seizure, [R. 136, 137, 138], which the district government announced that it had decided not to that matter. [R. 170 - 4-5].

powerpellets, by the power pellets, by the case agent further caused an additional power pellet
mistrial, which the district court denied. [R. 168 - 91-93].

The cause proceeded to trial commencing July 7, 2003. At the conclusion of the trial, on July 11, 2003, the jury found the defendant guilty of the same offenses as charged in the indictment. [R. 149; R. 172-87]. The district court sentenced him to a term of one and concurrent sentences of 120 months imprisonment, a \$25,000.00 fine and 10 years supervised release. [R. 155, 156; R. 173-87].
Matthews is incarcerated. This appeal follows.

B. Statement of the Facts.

The evidence in this case consisted of the testimony of the defendant, the case agent, two police officers, and two dealers who had made plea agreements with the case agent, and who also all had sentence reduction motions pending at the time of the trial, as well as the case agent and two police officers who testified to the arrest of Matthews in 1991. Special Agent Frank Matthews in 1991. Special Agent Frank Matthews testified that he was a member of the Jacksonville cocaine distribution network. Jacksonville cocaine distribution network calls intercepted by wiretap. [R. 168 - 75-98; R. 169-87].
intercepted calls on one telephone line, almost 100 calls.

almost 1,500 calls intercepted on a third line, Orochena's voice was on one call. [R. 169 - 12-14].

He testified that one of the last to cooperate of an investigation, Farrell Alston, was the person who identified Matthews as a person on that one call. [R. 169 - 15-16, 26, 28-29]. Despite personally identifying Matthews' voice on the arrest, [R. 169 - 12-14], Orochena also conceded information that Matthews' voice was on [R. 169 - 30-31]. Additionally, neither Matthews' name nor photo to him during the trial appeared on law to him during the reviews of intercepted conversations. [R. 169 - 29-30].

Alston, who had pled guilty to a cocaine charge for cooperation with a reduced sentence and a Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 sentence motion pending at the time of Matthews' trial, testified that he was establishing a supply of cocaine to a group of individuals starting in 1985. [R. 169 - 50-64]. He testified that he had obtained cocaine for eight years and obtained cocaine from Matthews on a couple of occasions. [R. 169 - 64-66]. He said that he had discussed cocaine with Matthews after being introduced to him by one James Brown, who he claims had

68]. Alston then testified that he obtained cocaine in 1999 and 2000, always at Brown's house, and that the quantity was between five and ten kilograms, but on one occasion it was between five and ten kilograms. He also testified that he once contacted Matthews himself, but that the one kilogram purchased each by him and Brown [R. 169 - 76-79]. Alston said he purchased cocaine at Brown's house, and that the quantity involved was three kilograms. However, he then testified that the previously described transactions were actually two separate transactions. He testified that he supplied cocaine to Matthews in 2000 at the rate of one or two kilograms about five times during 2000 at the rate of one or two kilograms about five times during for three kilos. [R. 169 - 89-92].

The Government used Alston to introduce a recording and transcript of an intercepted telephone call between him and another person in which they discussed dealing power pellets, a slang term for methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), also known as ecstasy. Alston acknowledged that the reference during his conversation

³ This evidence was subject to a motion in limine and further objection. This evidence was excluded because the statements contained on the tape were not in furtherance of

was to power pellets, and not cocaine. was to power pellets, and not cocaine. The
calling Sa-Ous, who Alston testified he understood to mean Terrence Matthews. calling Sa-O
[R. 169 - 111]. Alst[R. 169 - 111]. Alston also testified to an intercepted telephone
Matthews, Matthews, which Matthews, which the Government introduced, in which he Matthews,
discussed and agreed upon a per kilogram price of cocaine to
[R. 169 - 114-20].

While serving his sentence, Alston received letters from Matthews
124-56]. He testified that one 124-56]. He testified that
gestures and that others communicated to him that he should gestures and that other
that Matthews was not involved in the conspiracy. that Matthews was no

conspiracy and then, in light of the district court's ruling that
should be redacted, that the redacted conversation was misleading and out
because it might appear related to the charged conspiracy rather
pellets conspiracy between Alston and Moore. [R. 168 - 60-73]. pellets conspiracy b
ruling, Matthews then requested that if any portion
admitted, the entirety of it should be admitted. [R. 168 - 73; R. 1
district court recognized that Matthews continued his objection to
any portion of that recording, but was stuck making any portion of that recording, but v
ruling that at least a portion of the recording would be admitted. [R. 168 - 73].

The letters to Alston inquired whether he was lying on anyone to get time in prison because of others lying. [R. 169 - 128-56; Gov t. Exh. 14, 15, 16, 17].

Alston possessed a gun at the time of his sentencing enhancement in calculation of his sentence. Alston was one of the last in the case to cooperate with the Government. [R. 169 - 128-56]. Alston faced a ten year minimum mandatory sentence and a maximum of life on each of two counts with which he was charged. [R. 169 - 128-56]. Alston furnished Alston a Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 proffer letter, but at his sentencing never mentioned Matthews. [R. 169 - 179-80]. Alston never mentioned Matthews. [R. 169 - 179-80]. Alston over 400 kilograms of cocaine. [R. 169 - 179-80]. Alston over 400 kilograms of cocaine. [R. 169 - 179-80]. Alston months, months, months, [R. 169 - 53], following a Government recommendation for Alston to be sentenced to less than the 235 months minimum under the sentencing guidelines. [R. 169 - 188-94].

At the time of Matthews trial, the Government had filed a motion for Alston's sentence reduction recommendation to the court. [R. 169 - 194-98]. After being transported from the Bureau of Prisons, Alston was housed at the same small jail with the remaining

[R. 169 - 175-76]. Alston also admitted that his real name is Farrell Jackson, acknowledged inconsistencies with his grand acknowledged inconsistencies with his grand jury indictment. He met Matthews and admitted that he had met Matthews and admitted that he had met a Haitian cocaine source that he used. [R. 169 - 201-10].

James Brown, serving a 168-month sentence and with a Rule 35 motion pending at the time of his arrest, met Matthews at a gambling house in Miami. [R. 169 - 236-43]. Brown testified that he obtained cocaine from Alston to sell to people from Jacksonville. [R. 169 - 244]. He testified that he and Alston got cocaine from Matthews four times at Brown's house. [R. 169 - 248-50]. In contrast to Alston's four transactions, Brown said that the first cocaine transaction with Matthews was 10 to 15 kilograms in 1998 or 1999, that the remaining transactions were 10 kilograms each in 1999, and the greatest amount involved was 18 or 22 kilograms. [R. 169 - 251-52].

In his plea agreement, Brown obtained a sentence predicated on his having been involved with between 10 and 20 kilograms of cocaine. [R. 170 - 13-14]. Brown testified that during his proffer, [R. 170 - 13-14]. Brown testified that during his involvement in hundreds of kilograms, that he actually had sold thousands of kilograms of cocaine and that the Government could have proved a conviction for which he was charged and sentenced. [R. 170 - 15-17, 20, 22]. He admitted

that he scored at the highest criminal history that he scored at the highest criminal history that he scored at the highest criminal history, mandatory sentence of 20 years, mandatory sentence of 20 years, mandatory sentence of 20 years, mandatory sentence of 20 years, classified as a career offender, but that he was instead classified as a career offender, but that he was instead classified as a career offender, but that he had a Rule 35 sentence reduction motion pending had a Rule 35 sentence reduction motion pending had a Rule 35 sentence reduction motion pending had a Rule 35 sentence reduction motion pending 26]. Brown acknowledged that in the absence of a U.S.S.G. §5K1.126]. Brown acknowledged that in the absence of a U.S.S.G. §5K1.126]. Brown acknowledged that in the absence of a U.S.S.G. §5K1.126]. minimum sentence under the guidelines would have been 262 months. [R. 170 - 45-46]. He also acknowledged that he had been housed prior to Matthews trial with Alston, Moore and another testifying conspirator. [R. 170 - 47-48].

Yet another conspirator, Antonio A. Moore, entered into a plea agreement with the Government for conspiring to disseminate cocaine, and was sentenced to a term of 188 months but, at the time of sentencing, he had a Rule 35 sentence reduction motion pending. [R. 170 - 63-64]. Moore testified that during pretrial release he had tested positive for cocaine and failed to appear for a required urinalysis. [R. 170 - 65-66]. Moore sold crack cocaine and powder cocaine, which he had gotten from James Brown, from 1998 until his arrest in 2001. [R. 170 - 69-71].

Austin said that Brown had transactions with Matthews in the amount of \$50,000. Austin said that he observed Matthews furnish Jason Moore about \$10,000 of the proceeds from the transactions with Matthews. [R. 170 - 72-73].

gambling house. [R. 170 - gambling house. [R. 170 - 76-79, 81-82]. gambling house
prior to and during Matthews trial with other testifying conspirators and he
was housed at the federal courthouse lock-up with some of them. housed at the federal courthouse
said that he knew Matthews by the nickname Say Jack and said that he knew
informed him that Say Jack's real name was Terrence informed him that Say Jack's real name
Jason Moore, another testifying conspirator, admitted that Jason Moore, another testifying
some of his associates but before his arrest, he was concerned that othersome of his
cooperate against him and so arranged for cooperate against him and
of those indicted and free on bond, Shawn Richardson, resulting of those indicted and free on bond
wife and his daughter being wounded wife and his daughter being
received an enhancement of his sentencing guidelines for obstructing justice
170 - 125-26], he was never prosecuted on state charges regarding the 170 - 125-
170 - 128, 201-02]. He was charged with conspiracy to distribute
more of cocaine, [R. 170 - 120-21], pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine
and MDMA and ultimately was sentenced on and MDMA and ultimately was sentenced on the
15 to 50 kilograms of cocaine. [R. 170 - 120-21, 124, 125-26]. Moore was one of the
last in the investigation to cooperate and had made a plea agreement for a
to 50 kilograms of cocaine, despite having dealt somewhere between 200 and
kilograms. [R. 170 - 204-06]. Despite his obstructive

downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,⁴ and at the time of Matthews trial, the Government had filed a Rule 35 sentence reduction motion which remained pending. [R. 170 - 127, 129-30]. At the time of trial, his sentence was reduced to 18 months. [R. 170 - 128].

Moore said that he met the Defendant, who he knew as Say Jack Moore, in Ough, Ough, in 1999. [R. 170 - 133-34]. He testified that he obtained cocaine from Matthews in early 2000, another two kilograms from Matthews a few months later and another two or three months later and another two kilograms from [R. 170 - 139, 133-34, 147]. Moore testified that he had re [R. 170 - 139, 133-34, 147]. MaMatthMatthews while in prison, which he interpreted to be Matthews trying to determine whether Moore was cooperating and making whether Moore was cooperating he could get killed. [R. 170 - 159-61, 165-66, 169-73].

Another conspirator, Rodney Cannon, made a Government based on a conspiracy to distribute 150 to 500 grams of crack cocaine and, 150 to 500 grams of crack cocaine and, a

⁴ Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 8B(2)(b) (Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.

responsibility and a minor role in the offense, faced a minimum of 120 months but received a sentence of 78 months on the basis of a Government motion under U.S.S.G. §5K1.1. [R. 170 - 216-17]. He testified that he knew Matthews and that Matthews obtained two kilograms of cocaine from him in Miami. He acknowledged that he was among the group of people who were together while awaiting the commencement of Matthews' trial. [R. 170 - 238-39].

Richardson testified that he knew Matthews as Say Jay and that Matthews obtained his drugs from Moore and Linwood Smith. Richardson testified that he was involved in a conspiracy to sell crack and powder cocaine and that he received an eight-level reduction in his sentence on the basis of a U.S.S.G. §5K1.1 motion filed by the Government and ultimately received a 12-month sentence. [R. 171 - 6-10]. He testified that he saw Matthews at a house in Miami, and that Moore and Matthews subsequently left together in a rental car in which Richardson testified that there were two kilograms of apparent cocaine in the trunk. [R. 171 - 11-12]. Richardson testified that when he was supposed to drive the car back to Jacksonville, he was concerned about being pulled over by law enforcement because of too many black people in the car.

car, car, and cocaine car, and cocaine being found, acknowledging the phenomenon of being stopped by law enforcement for driving while black. [R. 171 - 23-25, 29]. Those with him flew back to Jacksonville. [R. 171 - 25].

Richardson also recounted his experience being wounded along with his wife and daughter while out on bond being wounded along with his wife and daughter while out on bond. [R. 171 - 26]. Although Moore had testified that he did not even after the shootings, [R. 170 - 120] even after the shootings, [R. 170 - 120] Richardson did not communicate with Moore because of the shooting. Richardson also acknowledged that the testifying conspirators were awaiting the Matthews trial. [R. 171 - 29-30].

The final testifying conspirator, Anthony Wells, also testified that he had traveled to Miami with Cannon and said that he had seen Cannon give the money to Moore, and that subsequently, he and Richardson found cocaine in the trunk of the car, cocaine in the trunk of the car, which they returned to Jacksonville by air. [R. 171 - 46-48, 52-57]. Wells previously pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine and received a year minimum mandatory sentence, received a sentence of 72 months. The Government filed a U.S.S.G. filing with Wells acknowledged that, at the time of Matthews

3535 sentence reduction motion, which remained pending. 35 sentence reduction motion, which that Moore obtained cocaine from Matthews, Brown and Alston. [R. 171 - 43-44].

TheThe Government concluded its case by presenting the testimony ofThe Government co DadDadeDade Dade police officers who were involved in arresting Matthews on December 1991,1991, over Matthews renewed objection under1991, over Matthews renewed objection under 73-85,73-85, 88-102].73-85, 88-102]. The officers testified that they observed a black male remove fromfrom the trunk of a car and making exchanges with others.from the trunk of a car and making testifiedtestified that they found 250 grams of cocaine,testified that they found 250 grams of cocaine individualindividual baggies, as weindividual baggies, as wellindividual baggies, as well as \$1,500.00\$1,500.00 in the trunk of the car. [R. 171 - 81-\$1,500.00 in the trunk of the car. testifiedtestified that Matthews,testified that Matthews, after being arrested andtestified that Mat he was just a worker, and not a lieutenant. [R. 171 - 102].

C. Standards of Review.

TrialTrial court determinations of the admissiTrial court determinations of the admission reviewedreviewed for abuse of discreviewed for abuse of discreviewed for abuse of discretion evidenceevidence of uncevidence of uncharged offevidence of uncharged offenses, the court n relevantrelevant to an issue in the case orelevant to an issue in the case other relevant to an i supportedsupported bsupported by proof ansupported by proof and has probative value that is n

the danger of unfair prejudice. *See, e.g., United States v. Mills*, 138 F.3d 928, (11th Cir. 1998). Abuse of discretion is an error of law if the court applies an incorrect legal standard, commits other error of law or ignores or misunderstands relevant facts. *See, e.g., United States v. Sigma International, Inc.*, 244 F.3d 1000, (11th Cir. 2001). A heightened abuse of discretion is an error of law if the court's admission of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) evidence is manifestly unjust. *United States v. ...*, 354 (5th Cir. 2003).

Whether the district court properly construed the scope of the exception to immediate sealing by the court of wiretap tapes, is an issue of law reviewed *de novo*. *See United States v. Ojeda-Rios*, 495 U.S. 257 (1990).

Sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is reviewed *de novo*, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. *e.g., United States v. Pendergraft*, 297 F.3d 1198, 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 2002).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The judgment and convictions below should be reversed because the court's improper submission of evidence of Matthews' 1991 conduct was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence of intent, the evidence lacked probative value, the evidence of intent, the conduct was excessively prejudicial, the evidence of intent, the evidence of the charged offenses. Additionally, the evidence of the charged offenses. Matthews is likely to believe the impeached testifying drug dealers. Accordingly, the judgment and convictions below should be reversed.

Evidence or recorded, wiretapped telephone conversations should have been excluded due to the Government's failure to disclose the evidence of the reason for the delay or why the delay bears no burden of proof or persuasion on this issue. Accordingly,

erroneous admission of the recordings and purposeful
convictions below should be reversed.

The evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for witness intimidation. His letters to two witnesses, which urged them to tell the truth and not to lie, are not witness intimidation. Accordingly, the district court's convictions on counts two and three should be reversed and the defendant remanded for resentencing because of these counts increasing Matthews' sentencing guidelines.

The district court should reverse the conviction for conspiracy to distribute a different drug than charged, because the evidence was irrelevant. The evidence was irrelevant to the conspiracy conversation in which two conspirators discussed an unrelated conspiracy to distribute a different drug than charged, because the conversation was not in furtherance of the conspiracy charged. Accordingly, the judgment and conviction should be reversed.

ARGUMENT

I.

**THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 404(b) TESTIMONY RE
STREET-LEVEL COCAINE TRAFFICKING
RELATED EVIDENCE FROM A RELATED EVIDENCE FROM
THE APPELLANT.**

The judgment below should be reversed because of the erroneous admission of other crimes evidence that is dissimilar to and remote in time from the evidence establish Matthews intent and was unfairly prejudicial to the Government's other evidence, testimony to please the Government to obtain reduced sentences. Accordingly, Matthews judgment and conviction should be reversed.

This Court has formulated a 3-part test to determine whether extrinsic evidence. See *United States v. Breitweiser*, ___ F.3d ___, 112810, 112810, *3, (11th Cir. January 26, 2004); *United States v. Lampley*, 68 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 1995); *United States v. Miller*, 959 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1992); *Huddleston v. United States*, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988). To be admissible

relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character; (2) the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its undue prejudice; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its undue prejudice and the evidence is not necessary to prove a material fact. Fed. R. Evid. 403. See, e.g., *Breitweiser*, 2004 W.L. 112810 at *3, and *Huddleston*, supra. Although Matthews' not guilty plea placed the element of intent at issue, see *United States v. Zapata*, 139 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1998), he did not challenge the issue of intent. See *United States v. Cardenas*, 1342 (11th Cir. 1990). Rather, his defense to the cocaine conspiracy was that the convicted conspirators who testified were simply lying about their involvement in cocaine deals and conspiracy at all.

Determining whether the prejudice of Matthew's extrinsic offense unfairly outweighed its probative value depends on the strength of the government's case on the extrinsic offense. See *United States v. Zapata*, 1061 (11th Cir. 1987). This Court has identified several factors to consider in determining whether the prejudice of Matthew's extrinsic offense unfairly outweighed its probative value: the strength of the government's case on the extrinsic offense, the amount of extrinsic and charged offenses, the amount of extrinsic and charged offenses, and whether it appeared at the commencement of trial.

defendant would contest the issue of intent. *United States v.*
1390 (11th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982).

**A. The Extrinsic Evidence Is Substantially Different The Extrinsic Evidence Is
Offenses.**

First, in considering the similarity of the extrinsic and First, in considering the
should be noted that relevancy is not determined by tshould be noted that relevancy is
prior bad act and prior bad act and the charged offense, but rather by the similarity of state
the perpetration of the two offenses. *United States v. Beechum*, 582 F. 2d 898, 913
(5th Cir. 1978) (Cir. 1978) (en banc).⁵ Only if the extrinsic evidence is very similar to the
charged offense as to their overall purposes may the extrinsic evidence
probative. *United States v. Delgado*, 56 F.2d 1357, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995), *cert.*
denied, 516 U.S. 1049 (1996). In *Dorsey*, this Court affirmed the, this Court
admission of the appellant's involvement in several admission of the appe
because they showed a willingness because they showed a willingness specific
identical to the offenses charged in the indictment. 819 F.2d at 1060.

⁵ In *Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 ()
this circuit adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered
prior to October 1, 1981.

In 1991, In 1991, the Miami Dade County Drug Task Force arrested Matthews for armed cocaine trafficking for dealing small-quantity, individual doses from a car parked on a street. In this case, the government accused Matthews of intent to join a criminal agreement to distribute cocaine, and sending intimidating letters to witnesses to conduct business than selling so-called "dime-bags" to users on the street. This case is not controlled by *Dorsey*.

In *Dorsey*, the Government charged conspiracies to import the Government charged conspiracy with the intent to distribute marijuana. 819 F.2d at 1060. *Dorsey* challenged the admission of a cooperating witness's testimony of his involvement in importation schemes not charged in the indictment, but during the period of time charged in the indictment. *Id.* The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the extrinsic evidence because the offenses were similar in nature . . . since both offenses involved large scale drug activity and both occurred within the same period of time. *Id.* at 1061, citing *United States v. Terebecki*, 692 F.2d 1345 (11th Cir. 1982).

In the instant case, while both the extrinsic evidence and the intrinsic evidence involved cocaine, the acts associated with the 1991 conviction involved a different state of mind than that associated with the charged offenses. See

582 F.2d at 913 (citation omitted). The activity in 582 F.2d at 913 (citation omitted). The act is not sufficiently similar in kind. Street sale of narcotics is not the same thing as a large scale conspiracy. *See United States v. Mejia-Urbe*, 75 F.3d 395, 398 (8th Cir. 1996). Cocaine sale is the only similarity between the charged offense and the bad act evidence that the government introduced. The indictment charged a large scale agreement and ongoing, multi-kilogram operation that Matthews allegedly entered into with the cooperating witnesses. While the Eleventh Circuit has upheld the use of prior bad acts where the prior bad act exhibited the same willingness as the charged offense, *see Dorsey*, 819 F.2d at 1, 819 F.2d at 1060, 819 F.2d at 1061. A bad act does not exhibit the same intent as the charged offense, the charged offense are not similar in kind, at least not if the bad act is not associated with the 1991 conduct. *See Mejia-Urbe*, 75 F.3d at 398.

This case parallels *United States v. Lynn*, 856 F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1988). In *Lynn*, the defendant stood trial on charges of conspiring to distribute marijuana and hashish, and importation and possession of marijuana. During the trial, the court admitted evidence, pursuant to Rule 404(b), of the defendant's arrest for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, which occurred eleven years prior to the trial. 856 F.2d at 430. Extrinsic act evidence should have been excluded.

noted that the state of mind of someone who consummated the state of mind of an undercover agent and one who participated in criminal enterprises involving drugs. *Id.* at 436. The court did not take the inference the prior street crime at 436. The court did not lightly. The court stated that the ordinary inference here. The court stated that the inference *the Rule was designed to avoid*. *Id. (emphasis added)*. Further, the court reasoned that the probative value of the evidence to any issue of character was weakened by the fact the extrinsic crime took place on different charged offenses and involved different participants. *See id.*

The same result obtains in this case. Selling dime-street, on one occasion simply is not similar to selling kilograms up the eastern coast of Florida a decade later. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Matthews' 1991 conduct.

B. The Extrinsic Offense Evidence Lacked Probative Value in Light of Government's Other Evidence and the Theory of Defense.

The 1991 evidence lacked probative value because (1) the Government already presented ample evidence of intent if the jury believed the witnesses and (2) the defense was that Matthews

at all, not that he was an ignorant participant in the plot all, not that he was an ignorant

Beechum, Beechum, 582 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1978) is the touchstone case on this

found that while

extrinsic evidence may be used to determine if the defendant possessed the same state of mind as he allegedly committed the offense when he committed the charged offense . . . its probative value must be determined with regard to the extent to which the defendant's unlawful intent is established by other evidence, stipulation, or inference.

If the Government presented substantial evidence on the issue of intent

extrinsic evidence is of little or no value. *See id.* at 914.

The use of the Defendant's meaningful evidence. The Government called meaningful evidence to the issue of the Defendant's alleged conduct, knowledge, and intent. The government's examination of the cooperating witnesses, the government's examination of the telephone call with Matthews, the government's examination of the record a series of letters written by Matthews, the government's examination of the letters. [R. 78]. The Government had a substantial case on the issue of intent. The defense did not challenge that element, but rather the defense did not challenge the testimony that Matthews engaged in the charged conspiracy at all. The Government would have succeeded in proving intent.

the testimony of the cooperating witnesses, rendering nethe testimony of the cooperating
intentent by the prior bad acts. *SeeSee United StaSee United States v. Lynn*, 856 F.2d 430, 4
1988).1988). The seven cooperating government wi1988). The seven cooperating govern
stipulationstipulation to the letters,stipulation to the letters, substantiallyreduced the probative val
street-level drug sale.

ThisThis case presents precisely the same issue in this regard as *UniteUnitedUnited States
Jackson*, 339 339 F.3d 349 339 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2003). Jackson was charged with aiding and abet
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admissionadmission of evidenadmission of evidence of a pradmission of evidence of a prior s
TheThe *Jackson* court applied the court applied the standards of court applied the standards of *U
911911 (5th Cir. Cir. 1978) (en banc)*, and and focused on the probative value of the Rule 404(b)
evidenceevidence in comparison to its undue prejudice. *Jackson*, 339 F.3d 339 F.3d at 356. [I
governmentgovernment has agovernment has a strong case on the intent issue, thegovernment ha
andand consequently willand consequently will be excluded more readily. *Id.*, quoting,quoting
atat 914. at 914. In*Jackson*, a member of the conspiracy, Jabby Lawson, a member of the conspira
hadhad participated in the charged conspiracy. 339 F.had participated in the charged conspira
thatthat a jurthat a jury wthat a jury would be hard-pressed to conclude that Jackson did not
intointo an agreement to ship stolen property ifinto an agreement to ship stolen property if it b
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the jury more likely to credit Lawson's assertion that Jackson was the fourth burglar because of Jackson's prior criminal conduct. This is exactly what Rule 404(b) forbids. *Id.*

The court also observed that Jackson did not claim to have been an innocent participant, but rather claimed that the nature of the defense even further lessened the probative value of the Rule 404(b) evidence in the case. *Id.* The Fifth Circuit concluded that unfair prejudice had been established because of the tendency of the evidence to suggest guilt on an improper basis. *Id.* The court also noted that when intent is an element of the defendant's commission of a crime not charged in the indictment goes more to the inadmissible purpose of proving that the defendant is a burglar than to the admissible purpose of proving intent. *Id.* 1057, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1976). The court found that the conviction was a abuse of discretion. *Jackson*, because the case rested otherwise on the testimony of the impeached testifying participant in the offense, the court concluded that the conviction was not harmless, and reversed his conviction. *Id.* at 358-59.

Matthews did not contest the testifying convicted defendant's presence. He simply asserted that the testifying convicted defendant's presence. He simply asserted that the testifying convicted defendant's presence.

about his very participation about his very participation in the charged about his very participation of the trial it was clear Mr. Matthews was not contesting the issue of intent. He attempted to persuade the jury that he participated in the conspiracy with a guilty state of mind.

The district court abused its discretion by allowing the admission of Mr. Matthews' prior bad acts when the Government had already presented ample other evidence which, if believed by the jury, would clearly establish intent. As a result, the admission of the prior bad acts was not probative of any issue not fully addressed by the other evidence and was unfair in nothing other than unfair prejudice. The district court could have convinced the jury to believe the other evidence. F.3d at 359. Accordingly, the judgment below should be reversed.

C. The Defendant's 1991 Conduct The Defendant's 1991 Conduct the Charged Offenses.

The court should have barred the government from presenting the defendant's prior bad acts because of the temporal remoteness of the 12-year gap. *Beechum*, 582 F.2d at 915, citing *United States v. Carter*, 516 F.2d 431, 434-435, 438 (11th Cir. 1975). The Eleventh Circuit has judged probative value by considering the

between the extrinsic offense and the charged offense. *See Beechum*, 582 F.2d 915; *see also United States v. Dorsey*, 819 F.2d at 1061; *United States v. Wyck*, 819 F.2d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986). *Carter* held a ten-year gap since defendant's last liquor law infraction was not a sufficient relation to prejudice that evidence of them. *See United States v. Pollock*, 926 F.2d 1044, 1048 (11 Cir. 1991), *see also United States v. Martin*, 505 F.2d 918, 919 (5th Cir. 1974) (convictions for interfering with justice that were nine and ten years old were too remote to be probative).

Additionally, *Carter* looked to the age of the defendant at the time of the extrinsic offense. *Carter* suggested that youth should be taken into consideration when deciding whether to admit extrinsic evidence against a defendant. 516 F.2d at 435. The immature judgment [when the defendant was 17 years old] was clearly a factor in concluding the earlier offenses lacked probative value regarding the defendant's intent in committing the charged offense. *Carter* was 20 years old when the prior bad acts took place.

D. The 1991 Evidence Should Have Been Excluded Because of Cumulative Reasons To Do So. and Fed.R.Evid. 403.

The district court should have barred the 1991 evidence because its probative value had been eliminated by: 1) the difference in the 1991 conduct and current offenses; 2) the temporal remoteness between the current offenses and the 1991 acts; 3) the strength of the government's case; 4) the steps taken by Matthews in not challenging the evidence at the time of the 1991 conduct. As a result, the evidence would prejudice the jury unfairly against him and render the jury's verdict against Matthews unreliable. The district court should have excluded the 1991 evidence because its probative value had been eliminated by: 1) the difference in the 1991 conduct and current offenses; 2) the temporal remoteness between the current offenses and the 1991 acts; 3) the strength of the government's case; 4) the steps taken by Matthews in not challenging the evidence at the time of the 1991 conduct. As a result, the evidence would prejudice the jury unfairly against him and render the jury's verdict against Matthews unreliable. The district court should have excluded the 1991 evidence because its probative value had been eliminated by: 1) the difference in the 1991 conduct and current offenses; 2) the temporal remoteness between the current offenses and the 1991 acts; 3) the strength of the government's case; 4) the steps taken by Matthews in not challenging the evidence at the time of the 1991 conduct. As a result, the evidence would prejudice the jury unfairly against him and render the jury's verdict against Matthews unreliable.

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 exists to provide a check on the admission of 404(b) evidence. *See, e.g., Breitweiser*, ___ F.3d at 2004 W.L. _____. The court must weigh the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. Probity is determined with reference to the probative value of the evidence and the danger of unfair prejudice. *See United States v. Matthews*, 1997 WL _____. Unfair prejudice is created when the evidence suggests a decision on an improper basis. *See United States v. Matthews*, 1997 WL _____. In this case, the Government's evidence rendered the probative value of the 1991 evidence unreliable.

best, leaving its sole effect as one of influencing the jury to best, leaving its sole effect as one of
the impeached conspirators because of Matthews the impeached conspirators because of Matthe
basis for decision. Accordingly, the judgment below should be reversed.

II.

THE DISTRICT ERRED IN FAILING TO SEAL THE WIRETAP EVIDENCE RECORDINGS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE WIRETAP.

The district court should have suppressed the intercepted wire communications because they were not sealed immediately upon their admission in evidence. At trial, two of the recordings were admitted in evidence. The district court issued an order admitting the recordings of intercepted wire communications as Exhibit A]. According to that order, the wire interceptions ceased on April 10, 2001, and the sealing order was entered by the district court on April 10, 2001. *Id.* April 10, 2001 fell on a Tuesday and April 12, 2001 fell on a Tuesday. A weekend or holiday fell on either date or intervened between the two dates. The district court presented no evidence of any reason for presenting the intercepted wire communications to the jury and sealed the recordings immediately upon the expiration of the authorized period of interception, without suppression. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed.

In denying Matthews' motion to suppress these wire intercepts, the district court, without citing any evidentiary or legal basis, merely concluded that the sealing was not unwarranted because of the packaging of the tapes. [R. 75]. However, the proffered evidence of the reason for the delay or the excusability of the delay.

The plain language of 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(a) requires that intercepted communications be presented to the authorizing judge and be sealed immediately upon the conclusion of the period authorized by the judge. In *United States v. Ojeda-Rios*, 495 U.S. 257 (1990), the Supreme Court, as a matter of course, required immediate sealing of intercepted communications. The Government's argument that proof of an absence of a satisfactory explanation of a delay in sealing. *Id.* at 264-65. The Court held that where sealing does not occur immediately, the Government must demonstrate the actual reason for the delay and to explain it. *See id.* at 265. *See also Jones v. United States*, 224 F.3d 1251, 1258, 224 F.3d 1251 (2000). The defense bears no burden of establishing an absence of tampering or proving tampering, and the defense also bears no burden of showing any prejudice. *Ojeda-Rios*, 495 U.S. at 265; *Jones*, 224 F.3d at 1258.

The Government provided no evidentiary explanation for presenting the recordings to the court for sealing. A possible reason for the delay may have been the district judge's representation regarding a detective's recollection, presented to the court as evidence. [R. 71 -2]. Even assuming this was the actual delay, and that the reason for the delay can be deemed sufficient in the absence of evidence, only the Eight and Ninth Circuits have indicated that unavailability of the issuing judge may constitute excusable delay. See *Rios*. See *United States v. Quintero*, 38 F. 3d 1317, 1330 (3rd Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The court in *Quintero* specifically rejected the holding in *Pedroni*, 958 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1992), that unavailability of the issuing judge constitutes excusable delay because another district judge had reviewed the tapes. *Quintero*, 38 F. 3d at 133, 38 F. 3d at 1330. The Second and Third Circuits have not addressed unavailability of the issuing judge as a basis for excusable delay. See *F.3d at 1330, citing United States v. [redacted]*, 869 F.3d 101 (2nd Cir. 1979), 869 F.3d 101 (2nd Cir. 1979), and *United States v. Rodriguez*, 786 F. 2d 472, 476 (2nd Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the issue, at least in *United States v. [redacted]*, 224 F. 3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000) (remanding for determination).

whether whether wiretap evidence necessary to sus whether wiretap evidence necessary to susta
in sealing was excusable under *Ojeda-Rios*).

Even the Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases standing for the proposition that the
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thethe circumstanthe circumstancethe circumstances of this case. In *United States v. Maxwell*
1994),1994), the period of delay was sev1994), the period of delay was seven days1994), the p
holidays,holidays, and the sealing date was set in advance by the isholidays, and the sealing da
InIn *United States v. McGuire*, 307 F. 3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2002), no district Cir. 2002), no distri
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should be reversed.

about about him in order to obtain about him in order to obtain reduced sentences
indicted defendant to communicate with potential Government witnesses
witnesses not to lie to the Government or the court in order to obtain sentence
reductions simply cannot constitute intimidation or corrupt persuasion. *See United
States v. Lowrey*, 135 F.3d 967, 958-59 (5th Cir. 1998).

Alston testified that a letter might have been making threatening gestures,
and Moore said that Matthews was trying to learn if he was cooperating and that
reference to one person's death implied that a snitch could be killed
[R. 169 - 131; R. 170- 169-73]. The letters, however, spoke of
his [Matthews] attorney despite the heat on this [Matthews] attorney despite the heat on
[sic] like that like they are trying to put it; the folks [sic] like that like they are trying to
something man you know that man didn't have anything to something man you know that
like I'm losing every one I love from niggers lying on them; asked if you are like I'm
on anyone to get time cut off you; and questioned Don't you think there is on anyone
[sic] brothers in there for nothing on the count of another brother [sic] brothers in there for
them. [See R. 78; Gov't Exh. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].

The letters urged Alston and Moore not to obtain reduced sentences, but rather to tell the truth to the court
unlawful, and what is contained in the letters is unlawful, and what is contained in the letters is

them by Alston and Moore. Accordingly, the judgment as to counts two and three should be reversed.

Furthermore, resentencing is required on counts two and three. The district court must relevel enhancement for obstruction of justice, and the district court must relevel enhancement in light of the insufficiency of the evidence on counts two and three. Accordingly, the judgment below should be reversed.

IV.

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TELEPHONE TELEPHONE TELEPHONE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION T
APPELLANT APPELLANT APPELLANT WAS NOT A PARTY AND WHO
RELATED TO A DRUG CONSPIRACY IN WHICH
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT IMPLICATED.**

The judgment below should be reversed because the district court's judgment was based on an intercepted telephone conversation between Jason Moore and Farrell Alston, in which Matthew Matthews did not participate and which related to a drug conspiracy in which Alston and Moore. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states:

Relevant evidence means evidence that makes the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Mr. Matthews was not a participant in the conversation. The conversation between Moore and Alston does not make it more or less probable that Matthews participated in a conspiracy. The intercepted telephone conversation between Moore and Alston involved an exchange of dialogue pertaining to ecstasy pills, also known as power pellets, a slang term for MDMA.

The intercepted telephone conversation The intercepted telephone conversation between Mr. Matthews and the other co-conspirators, is a statement which was being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Mr. Matthews was a willing participant in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine.

The only arguably related exception to the hearsay rule, admissions statements made by co-conspirators, is in Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) states in part:

A statement of one co-conspirator is admissible against the others as admission of a party opponent in both civil and criminal cases if made during the course of furtherance of the common objective of the conspiracy.

(Emphasis added) However, Matthews was not a party to the conversation which pertains to ecstasy, rather than cocaine. It cannot be drawn that statements made by Moore and Alston and the conversation, and involving ecstasy, were made during the furtherance of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine as charged against Matthews.

Any dialogue applicable under the co-conspirator exception to the rule must pertain to the common objective. The common objective to charges against Matthews, would be the conspiracy to distribute cocaine as charged against Matthews. The intercepted telephone conversation between Moore and Matthews, and the intercepted telephone conversation between the two of them to distribute ecstasy, is a statement which was being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Mr. Matthews and the charges against him.

conversation between Moore and Alston is conversation between Moore and Alston is an exception to the hearsay rule.

Finally, the Government used other evidence in the form of cooperating witnesses to attempt to prove the elements of the offense. *See Old Chief v. United States*, 519 U.S. 172, 182-83 (1997) (if alternative evidence were found of alternative evidence were found of value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it if the value of the item first offered and exclude it if substantially outweighs substantially outweighs substantial probative value). *See* F.2d 513, 521 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating: if the government has a strong case without the extrinsic offense...then the prejudice to the defendant will outweigh the marginal value of the extrinsic offense). The district court tangibly prejudiced Matthews' defense by admitting conversation between Alston and Moore, which was reversed.

CONCLUSION

ForFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment and convictions below should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

UndersignedUndersigned counsel certifies, pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 32(a)(7), tUnders
foregoing brief contains 10,227 words.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing have been furnished to
Marcio W. Valladares, Esquire, Assistant United States Attorney, Assistant United States Attorney,
Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202, by United States Mail, this
2004, and the Internet upload to the
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ATTORNEY

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